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Abstract 
Contributing to the resurgent debate on urban informality in the global south, 
Kamete (2013) charged that urban planners in Southern Africa have a fetish about 
informality that is fuelled by an obsession with modernity.  In these and other 
writings, Zimbabwe’s 2005 Operation Murambatsvina (OM) is used as a prototype 
planning malfeasance.  Using the concept of fetish and fetishism, this paper argues 
that a fixation on and fetish about planning and planners has led some planning 
scholars to churn out misplaced or misleading understandings of OM regarding the 
role of planning the operation.  Inevitably, recommendations for planning reform 
from such scholarship are largely inefficacious. It is time planning scholars looked 
seriously beyond planning for both analytical tools and space for political activism. 
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Introduction: the rumblings of Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina 
Demolition of rural and urban squatter settlements, informal enterprises and the removal to 
rural areas of urban ‘vagrants’ and ‘undesirables’ remains an intermittent occurrence since 
colonial days in Zimbabwe1 and Southern Africa more broadly (CCJP, 1994; Mbiba, 2001; 
Potts, 2007; Vambe, 2008; Potts, 2011; Kamete, 2013).   Between May and July 2005, the 
government of Zimbabwe unleashed an unprecedented globally condemned countrywide 
demolition of alleged informal economy activities and housing structures.  The campaign 
was code named Restore Order or Operation Murambatsvina; meaning ‘he or she who 
despises filth’.  The exercise was unprecedented in that it was wholesale in scope, thorough 
and militaristic in its execution.   Crucially and paradoxically, it occurred at a time when 
livelihoods were precarious and the state was politically and economically under siege even 
though the ruling ZANU (PF) party had just won another parliamentary majority in national 
elections earlier in the year. Moreover the bulk of the structures were legal as will be 
explained in the third section below.  
 
At the instigation of the UK Government and alleging that crimes against humanity had been 
committed (Mbiba, 2006), the UN dispatched a Special Envoy, Mrs Anna Kajumulo 
Tibaijuka (then Executive Director of UN-BABITAT ) in July 2005  who conducted the first 
authoritative investigation of OM  (UN-HABITAT, 2005). We shall refer to this as the 
Tibaijuka Report.    The Government of Zimbabwe provided a written response to the 
Tibaijuka Report (GoZ, 2005), although this response has largely been absent in the 
subsequent academic commentary probably due to its non-available in the public domain. In 
its findings, the Tibaijuka Report, estimated that “…some 700 000 people in cities across the 
country … lost their homes, their sources of livelihoods or both.  Indirectly, 2.4 million 
people (were) affected in varying degrees” (UN-HABITAT, 2005: 7).  There was also an 
                                                 
1    See periodic media reports in New Zimbabwe.com; Nehanda Radio; Newsdzezimbabwe.co.ok  including the 
latest for demolitions in Harare. http://nehandaradio.com/2016/10/27/demolitions-leave-3000-families-
homeless-along-harare-masvingo-road-pictures/ [last visited 3rd July 2017]. 
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avalanche of media, civil society (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005; 2010; Slaughter, 2005; 
Olaleye and Tungwarara, 2005) and scholarly reports (for example Shale, 2006; Kamete, 
2007; 2009; 2013; Potts, 2007, 2008; Vambe, 2008) on this phenomenon that continues and 
with attention paid to the rights and legal issues (Nicolai, 2006; COHRE/ZLHR, 2007; 
Hughes, 2007), humanitarian, livelihoods, social and economic impacts (UNICEF, 2005; 
ActionAid International, 2005; Potts, 2008), political and international relations dynamics 
(ICG, 2005; Mbiba, 2006; Sadomba, 2011)  and the implications for urbanisation and urban 
planning (Fegue, 2007; Kamete, 2007, 2009, 2013; Potts, 2007;2008 ).   Operation 
Murambatsvina had hidden dimensions (Vambe, 2008) including its obscure causes, key 
drivers behind it, and motivations for its timing.  But while the ruthlessness of its execution 
was unprecedented and violation of rights undisputed, the role of planning was not only 
obscure but appears misunderstood and misinterpreted by planning scholars.     
 
Since 2005, and taking a leaf from the Tibaijuka Report, there has been a stream of 
publications that use or point to OM as symptomatic of colonial planning and failure of 
planners in Africa.  Planning scholars have been unrelenting in portraying planners as the 
culprits or presenting OM as a failure of planning.    Kamete (2007; 2013) castigated 
unfeeling planners for their technocratic planning and for unleashing Operation 
Murambatsvina.   The victims are presented as ‘victims’ of planning (Potts, 2011; Kamete, 
2007;  Watson and Abola, 2013).   In contrast, most other social scientists and civil society 
reports hardly mention planners or see Operation Murambatsvina as a failure of local 
authority planners.  Even in the widely cited Tibaijuka Report (UN-HABITAT, 2005) only 
one of the seven recommendations focused on planning and at any rate this was misdirected 
as will be illustrated and discussed in section three of this paper.   To appreciate this 
continued fixation with and presentation of OM as an exemplar of planning failure, this paper 
will extend use of the idea of ‘fetish and fetishism’ (Kamete, 2013).  But unlike Kamete 
(2013), the paper flips the idea and suggests that while the response of planning to 
informality leaves significant room for improvement, it is planning scholars that have a fetish 
about planners and planning.  The conclusion underlines the need for more radical 
reformulations of how we understand what planning represents in contexts of crisis (Roy, 
2009)  especially in relation to power and the way we intervene in managing cities of 
Southern Africa. 
   
Given the notions of power that underpin planning, the next section will briefly sketch the 
ideas of power informing this paper. This is followed by an outline of how ‘fetish’ and 
‘fetishism’ is understood for purposes of this discussion and extends the way it has been used 
in Kamete (2013).   The emerging conceptions are then used to shine a light on the Southern 
African planning scholarship vis a vis Operation Murambatsvina and in particular to examine 
whether and to what extent the phenomenon can be portrayed as a planning exercise as 
presented in planning scholarship – including most recently in Watson and Agbola (2013) 
and Kamete (2013).   The analytical approach in this desktop study is thus textual and 
assesses the planning literature on OM against the Tibaijuka Report as well as the national 
planning policy that this literature refers to.  The deep political economy origins of OM are 
captured elsewhere in the literature including the view that it was a central intelligence (CIO) 
operation to foil a possible countrywide uprising (Vambe, 2008; Sadomba, 2011).   It is not 
the purpose of this paper to delve into these critical dimensions. Rather it seeks to highlight 
the bluntness of analysis by planning scholars and urge that future reviews look beyond the 
discipline for tools and practical guidance for actions that offer radical alternatives for 
structural change in the urban political economy of Southern Africa. The work of Harvey 
(2014) and Roy (2009) points in the direction for such needed understanding of the political 
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and economic dynamics that shape urban spaces – with a focus on state-capital-society 
relations (Mbiba, 2017).   
 
 
A brief note on power  
Interrogating power in planning practice (Kamete, 2011; Mantysalo, 2008; Innes, 2006; 
Flyvbjerg and Richardson, 2002) and the perceived crisis (Grange, 2016) or malaise of its 
professional and academic status (Campbell, 2014) is a major preoccupation in planning 
debates. Although consensus is hard to come by (Harris, 2011), the debates view planning as 
a rational, bureaucratic and technical exercise of regulatory and expert power to control and 
guide land-use change.  However, in contexts of crisis (Roy, 2009) like that of Zimbabwe, 
attention should be more on critiquing the historical, political-economy and governance 
forces ( the state) that underpin and circumscribe planning as this is where real power dwells.  
Power is conceptualised in several interrelated ways at the core of which are the ‘two faces of 
power’ (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), namely the ‘power to’ and ‘power over’. ‘Power to’ or 
generative force (Mantysalo, 2008) is the ability to change ourselves and the world around 
us; such as to tax, to use force, to stop development, to discipline society, to redistribute 
resources such as land and other products of economic growth.  In planning processes, this 
‘power to’ is largely about collective, rather than individual endeavour, to influence decisions 
that affects us. 
 
This capacity or power to change things derives from and is intertwined with ‘power over’ 
i.e. control, ownership and access to resources. Mantysalo (2008) adds ‘explicit’ and 
‘implicit’ dimensions of ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ such that a matrix of at least four 
categories of power emerges. For the state,  ‘power over’ includes critical monopoly control 
of the instruments of force such as the military, police, prisons, militia as well as the 
judiciary and soft power in the form of knowledge systems, the media and planning that are 
its ‘hidden’, implicit and subtle forms.  Power features in planning and development studies 
for instance around the question of ‘why poor people stay poor’ that has been answered with 
ideas of ‘empowerment’ (Chambers, 1984 ) that pervade participatory development and the 
sustainable livelihoods framework thinking (see Rakodi and Lloyd-Jones, 2002) ubiquitous 
in development literature since the late 1990s.  Control and access to capital (natural, human, 
political, social, financial etc.) is seen as critical for not only the survival of households, 
institutions and communities but also their ability to make progress. 
  
To reiterate, ‘power to’ and ‘power over’ are not mutually exclusive and both are implicated 
in the Foucaltian views of power as ‘exercising political sovereignty’ and ‘acting on others’ 
actions’ (Gordon, 1991: 5) which is the domain of planning (Kamete, 2011).  However, in 
acting on the actions of others, urban planners do so as instruments of the state, as part of the 
implicit architecture of governance; with resources and capacity derived from and permitted 
by the state.  In crisis contexts like Zimbabwe, the idiom of governance is authoritarian with 
the state suspending its own laws, including planning laws Murambatsvina style, to operate 
informally (Roy, 2009) so as to assert its authority and retain power.  
 
The history of Zimbabwe shows that this practice of ‘state-informality’ has been repeated 
countless times in other spheres of the political economy including in jambanja. Jambanja or 
the “Third Chimurenga” (revolution) is indigenous lexicon that refers to Zimbabwe’s famous 
ongoing and highly contested  ‘fast track’ Land Reform Program ongoing  post 1999.  
Nuanced discussions and meanings of these concepts from the Zimbabwean landscape 
abound  (Scoones, et al. 2010; Sadomba, 2011; Hanlon et al. 2012; Mbiba 2017).  Any power 
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that planning may have (any or all forms described above) is in the gift of the state. When the 
state suspends operational laws and planning regulations, ignores planners and  dis-
empowers bureaucratic institutions of urban development and in their place inserts armed 
soldiers, youth militia, land barons and ruling party aligned cooperatives (Muchadenyika and 
Williams, 2017), a different ‘governmentality’ (Gordon, 1991) is in place.  To call that 
planning as is done in representations of OM is to fetishize planning as elaborated below. 
Beyond the state and planners there are manifold agents/actors and aspects of power at play 
in urban planning processes (Mantysalo, 2008; Mbiba, 2017; Muchadenyika and Williams, 
2017).  Institutions, businesses and activists may use their power to influence planning 
decisions or even to corrupt the system.  The aspects of power outlined above are not 
exhaustive but will be used as a sensitising reference point for the discussion.  The view in 
this paper is that the primary power relations relevant to analysis of OM in Zimbabwe are 
those at the state –planning interface. 
 
The idea of a fetish and fetishism 
In their reviews, both Ellen (1988) and Dant (1996) identified three broad traditions in the 
usage of the concept of fetish and fetishism; namely the religious sphere dominated by 
anthropological writings, the sphere of sex dominated by psychology and that of political 
economy dominated by Marxists.  Anthropological usages have origins in medieval times, 
and use fetish as a term to refer to witchcraft and the worship of inanimate objects as 
reported by early Portuguese sailors following travels to West Africa.   Fetish and fetishism 
is ‘… when an object is believed to be a spiritual force in itself’ (Ellen, 1988: 218), hence the 
veneration of charms (the fetish).   Theorisations of fetishism of this nature tend to designate 
it as a pure condition of un-enlightenment (Pietz, 1993: 136) practiced by ‘primitive’ 
peoples.   ‘Proprietors’ of the fetish perceive it as a bearer of powers beyond the ordinary 
when in reality such power is materially non-existent.  In the context of this paper, even 
though it may suit us to believe or wish that planners and planning have power, they become 
a ‘fetish’ if we ascribe to them powers which in reality they do not have.  
  
In the psychological literature on sexual ‘deviance’, fetishism is about fantasy and desire 
(Dant, 1996) and practices in which objects are used as a substitute for the real thing: the 
human body.  In other words, sexual fetishism describes erotic obsessions for or with objects 
that often act as substitutes for persons of the opposite sex; a form of sexual perversion.  The 
way artefacts and objects become objects of sexual desire or bearers of sexual pleasure is in a 
way similar to how perception of power in the witchcraft objects become real to those who 
believe.  In the case of OM did planners really have the power as claimed by scholars?   
Could it be the case that instead of going for the real thing where power resides (the state), 
planning scholars are attacking the hapless substitute?   
 
The Marxist political economy view focuses inter alia on how an object, in particular a 
commodity assumes attributes or qualities that conceal its true meaning, value or economic 
function (see Marx, 1990: 125 - 244). Commodities appear in a form different from their 
intrinsic content; they appear as material expressions of the socially necessary labour time 
required in their production.  But the prevailing social relations (be it slavery, night work, 
poor working conditions, child labour, migrant labour etc.) in the production of the 
commodities is concealed and hidden from the consumers. Money is the epitome of this 
fetishism.   It seems the main difference between the Marxist view and the other two is that 
for Marx (1990), the fetish has real qualities (value); one aspect that is recognisable without 
difficulty and then another that remains hidden and is more pervasive.  The three categories 
are not mutually exclusive and various combinations in their use are possible.   
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Key in all the above three conceptions or usages is the displacement of meaning of the object 
of desire or of value onto something else.  Dant (1996: 5-6) underlies this transfer or 
displacement and states that 
 … it is through the displacement of desire that an object acquires special 
social value, indicated by the reverence, worship or fascination with which it 
is treated.  That desire may be religious, economic or erotic value…in this 
case, the displacement of meaning implies that there is no mistake or 
misunderstanding of the nature of real objects. 
 
Power, displacement, obsession, concealment, illusion and misunderstanding are all aspects 
of the fetish we have to unravel in the conduct of planning scholarship vis a vis Operation 
Murambatsvina. The crux of the matter should be to unravel the power concealed or hidden 
behind planning.  However in the context of OM, this theoretical dissection of planning 
scholarship will need to be prefaced by and articulated with aid of empirical clarifications.  
The next section deals with these matters of fact in the way some planning scholars have 
presented OM using Watson (2006) and Watson and Agbola (2013 as examples.  It assesses 
the extent to which planning related texts provide an accurate reflection of what prevails on 
the ground.  Some nuggets in the interrogation of planning’s power can be noted in Kamete 
(2011) regarding its differential deployment in affluent spaces versus that in poor 
neighbourhoods.  But further extensions of such analysis of power is needed in what this 
power represents, who really is behind it and whether phenomena such as OM should be 
described as planning at all.  In line with power ideas given earlier spatial or urban planning 
is just one among many instruments available to the state in its exercise of sovereign power 
(Kamete, 2011; 2013).  OM was a case where the state deployed alternative instruments of 
power beyond planning. The urban coincidence in the use of coercive power (acting on 
others’ actions) within urban areas does not in itself make it urban planning. 
 
Operation Murambatsvina was not about planning: it violated planning procedures.  
Writing a promotional piece for the Association of African Planning Schools, Watson and 
Agbola (2013) lament the outdated and archaic nature of planning education and systems in 
Africa.   They call for a new breed of planners that are ‘innovative problem solvers’.   The 
planning laws in Harare are singled out as outdated and an irrelevance to most inhabitants.  
And to illustrate the negative impacts of these outdated master plans, Watson and Agbola 
(2013: 2) cite the case of Operation Murambatsvina: 
… In 2005, 700 000 people were evicted from their homes in Harare, 
Zimbabwe’s capital city.  ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ or ‘Drive Out the 
Rubbish’ … was legitimised by the 1976 Town and Country Planning Act.  This 
was in turn based on the UK’s 1947 Town and Country Planning Act and model 
town and country planning laws widely implemented by the British Colonial 
Office in Africa and the Caribbean. State authorised evictions carried out under 
the auspices of colonial era legislation have become a common feature of life in 
African cities.  Planners are often involved as the ‘handmaiden of state 
repression’. 
Empirically however, UN-HABITAT (2005: 7) clearly states that, as a result of OM, 
“…some 700 000 people in cities across the country … lost their homes, their source of 
livelihoods or both…”.   The figure is for ‘across the country’ as the phenomenon was 
countrywide (see Vambe, 2008) and not just in Harare as stated by Watson and Agbola 
(2013).   Moreover, the figure is not just for housing evictions but loss of ‘homes, livelihoods 
or both.  OM was devastating to all affected - both directly and indirectly; hence the 
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appropriate metaphor of a social ‘tsunami’ (Fontein, 2009)  used by locals to refer to it.   
Both the government’s own figures (GoZ, 2005) and those of UN-HABITAT (2005) make 
this obvious.    So there is no need for planning scholars to distort and exaggerate the original 
statistics.   The generalisations on old colonial laws also need to be examined more closely.   
Making a presentation at the RTPI Planning Convention London  held 28 June - 30 June 
2006 at Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, London, Professor Watson pointed  out that 
the  previous year’s slum clearance in Zimbabwe in which 700 000 people lost their homes or 
livelihoods was carried out under a 30 year old legislation. Well, the last part is not correct 
since the legislation has been revised many times since 1976.   At the time of OM, the 
country was operating under the Zimbabwe Town and Country Planning Act [Chap. 29:12] 
Revised Edition 1996.   Crucially, Statutory Instrument 216 of 1994 [SI 216] (GoZ, 1994a) 
under the same legislation was crafted to permit informal trading and promote small 
enterprises (home industries) in residential areas and parts of the city centres (hence flea 
markets) thus enabling more of the formally marginalized Black Zimbabweans to participate 
in the economy and in urban spaces previously the preserve of Whites. It introduced greater 
flexibility into the development control system making it possible for the Black majority to 
occupy livelihood spaces that previous regimes had prohibited.   Similarly, SI 271 of 1994 
(GoZ, 1994b),  made across the board reductions in prescribed endowments payable when 
land is subdivided thus making it more attractive for private developers to participate in 
urban land and housing development. A couple of further points can be made here without 
having to go into a detailed review of Zimbabwe’s planning legislation. 
First is the fact that the planning laws in Zimbabwe are flexible and allow innovative 
planners and local councils to engage communities and design appropriate programmes 
dealing with informality including urban agriculture (see MDP, 2003).   The fact that the 
laws may have origins in the 1947 British Town and Country Planning Act is really not a 
problem in itself.  The issue that should concern us is not ‘how old?’ but whether the laws 
can be used to deliver productive and harmonious environments for our communities. 
Statutory Instruments are one of the mechanisms that enable the state to adjust the law in 
response to changing circumstances where repeal of the statute may be unnecessary or 
unfeasible. The SI 216 of 1994 and the subsequent spread of home industries illustrates that 
legal flexibility and its livelihood impacts.  In those cases of planning maleficence, it may not 
be the law at fault but the way in which devious agents manipulate and abuse it at the 
expense of communities; in the case of OM the planning law was ignored.   
 
At the risk of ‘flogging a dead horse’, one can use a UK comparison.   Health and Safety in 
the UK is managed under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974 (over forty years old).  
However, specific ‘Regulations’ (at least eleven of them) have been passed periodically to 
help address any particular issues that the act may not have anticipated.  That the act is over 
forty years old is not an issue in itself.  Furthermore, the operations of Zimbabwe’s Town and 
Country Planning Act have to be considered in the context all the allied statutes especially 
the Urban Councils Act and the Environment Act.  The new Zimbabwe Constitution (2013) 
has also provided a new framework in which these statutes operate reinforcing the aspects of 
good governance.  However, the harmonisation and alignment of all statutes with the 
Constitution is going at a snail’s pace largely due to resistance from power brokers in the 
state.  
The second point is on the political nature of OM and that no ‘innovative planner’ would 
have stopped that.  Kamete  (2011) and Potts (2011) acknowledge this point in some of their 
reviews.  OM was a political phenomenon that used planning as ‘rhetoric and scapegoat’.  
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Following SI 216 and other local authority programmes, traders, small industries, lodgers, 
landlords and customers alike increasingly came to see these ‘informal activities’ as secure, 
legal and legitimate.  However, there was a political balancing act, as captured by Potts 
(2011: 717): 
… there was a political contract - the expectation was that grateful residents 
would vote for the ruling party ZANU (PF).   They did not.   As with the 
commercial farmers, in the end tenure security in the backyard shacks 
disappeared as it depended on the state’s perceptions of its own interests. 
Thus, from Potts’s (2011) nuanced analysis in the above citation, the origins, motivations and 
nature of OM are located in state politics and not local authority planning.  Regarding 
dimensions of housing, Potts (2011: 714 – 718) suggest that it was the result of the state’s 
‘change of mind about the legitimacy of backyard shacks’.   Therefore, whether the laws 
were colonial or not, the material political economy conditions were that OM was still going 
to be unleashed. We shall pursue this point latter.   
From a purely procedural town planning perspective, Zimbabwe’s planning legislation as 
such is neither archaic nor prohibitive as scholars often portray it to be. For instance, in 
Zimbabwe’s second largest city Bulawayo, long before OM, a 2000 Master Plan2 was 
already in place.   Its content goes beyond traditional land use issues; a plan that is 
integrative, responds to current socio-economic challenges, allocates land to and promotes 
pro-poor activities such as urban agriculture.   Individual local authorities can also craft by-
laws specific to their circumstances as in the case of periodic street markets that operate in 
the Midlands city of Gweru. 
 
The erroneous practice by scholars to equate OM to poor or archaic legislation has origins 
largely in the misdirected Tibaijuka Report (UN-HABITAT 2005).   Reports of leading 
NGOs, civil groups and local critics of the Zimbabwe government all seem to concur that the 
decision to implement OM was not by urban local authorities and that the manner in which 
the campaign was executed was neither reasonable nor within the law3.  Institutional key 
informant respondents cited in Kamete (2009) emphasized this point that local government 
officials and planners were nowhere near the initiation and execution of the campaign.  
 
Similarly, the Tibaijuka report in sections 6.3.1 to 6.3.5 gives a clear catalogue of how 
Operation Murambasvina did not follow provisions of the Town and County Planning Act, 
stating for example that “… no orders were issued under the Planning Act or any other 
legislation” in the areas where evictions and demolitions took place.  It goes further in 6.3.3. 
to state that for example “ … the cities of Bulawayo, Mutare and Victoria Falls which are the 
authorities responsible for any demolitions under their jurisdiction, were not consulted when 
the demolitions and evictions started in their respective cities”.   Given that local authorities 
are also the planning authorities in Zimbabwe, then if they were not consulted or involved, 
then claims of OM being about planning are misplaced. Moreover, for City of Harare, 
between 1999 and 2008, the city was controlled and run by state appointed commissions and 
not elected councillors plus mayor as required by law (Mbiba, 2017: 9); an abnormal 
situation not conducive to planning.  Hence any reference to ‘local authority’ in the case of 
                                                 
2   Bulawayo’s second Master Plan since independence in 1980. Since 1980, nearly all 
Master Plans in Zimbabwe have been prepared by local experts and the 2000 Bulawayo 
Plan had the greatest citizen and stakeholder involvement. 
3   Most of these reports can be found at http://www.sarpn.org.za/ (search for 
murambasvina on that site) [last visited 30th June, 2017] 
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Harare should underline the illegality and state nature of the authority at the time of 
Operation Murambatsvina; it could be argued that whatever an illegal and illegitimate 
authority presided over would be illegal and illegitimate4 as well.   
 
Furthermore, Potts (2011: 717) correctly notes that Zimbabwe’s planning legislation 
stipulates that in the event evictions are necessary, it is additionally important that affected 
people have sufficient warning and receive adequate compensation (see also Auret, 1994).    
In OM, neither proper warning nor compensation was given.  In this respect, OM was a 
replay of previous evictions such as Churu Farm (Auret, 1994) when evictions proceeded 
using the military and in violation of both planning procedures and High Court injunctions in 
favour of the evictees.  In section 7.2.4, the Tibaijuka report suggests that there was ‘no 
collective decision making with respect to conception and implementation’ of OM but advice 
by a few architects of the operation.  We are not told who these few individuals are (were) 
but the report clearly impresses on readers that this as well as the police and military 
involvement was (is) outside planning law. 
 
After giving an eloquent description of how OM was outside the Town and Country 
Planning Act, the Tibaijuka report somersaults and somehow comes up with bizarre 
recommendations to “suspend outdated laws”, calls for an “immediate revision of the 
outdated Town and Country Planning Act and other relevant Acts to align the substance 
and procedures of these Acts with social, economic and cultural realities facing the majority 
of the population, namely the poor” (UN-HABITAT, 2005: 8). Unfortunately scholars have 
propagated these recommendations as a ‘truth’ when in fact the Tibaijuka report has no 
compelling evidence to back up such a position.  As mentioned earlier planning and 
planners in Zimbabwe have moved a long way from the ‘colonial inheritance’ and 
Bulawayo City is a good place to go if anyone wants to find how town and country 
planning has evolved in response to the needs of the poor.  Yes, it is not perfect but it is 
neither based on 30 year old laws and nor should it be equated to the framework for OM.  If 
the prevailing planning procedures had been followed at the time of OM, the operation 
would not have been as brutal or widespread at it turned out - at least in cities like 
Bulawayo, Mutare and Victoria Falls as implied in the Tibaijuka Report.  
 
The Fetishisms of Planners  
The empirical detail in the above section points to a marginal role (if any) for planners and 
planning in both the origin and execution of OM in contrast to what scholars (Watson, 2006; 
Watson and Agbola, 2013) ascribe to them.  As Harris (2011) reminds use, planning operates 
through statutory control and enforcement to achieve compliance not punishment. OM was 
about punishment not compliance.  Furthermore, the material and institutional capabilities of 
planners and planning would not have stopped OM as implied by Watson and Agbola (2013).    
As both a misunderstanding of and obsession with planning, the scholars give planning 
powers it does not possess – it becomes a fetish.  For Marx, the fetishism of commodities is 
that while they may have concrete material value, they also hide or conceal a culturally 
determined value and social relations.  They conceal the socially necessary labour time 
deployed in their production.   The import of this for our understanding of planning and 
planners is that planning laws and planners have value that is material to our routine needs 
(for developers, business, and residents).  Yet, what we see in the planning laws and what we 
                                                 
4 At the time of OM, the city was run by a government appointed Commission chaired by 
Mrs Sekesai Makwavarara. 
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see of planning work conceals the real power; the power of planners and planning, if any, 
resides not in planners but in state power.   Scholars should strive to examine what is 
concealed behind the eviction actions, what they represent that appears to be planning but is 
not. 
 
Consequently, where planning appears to fail, scholars should look beyond and interrogate 
this as failures of state power.  In the case of OM, most other social scientists (e.g. Vambe, 
2008; Sadomba, 2011; Potts, 2011) have done exactly that – save for planning academics and 
scholars typified by Watson and Agbola (2013).  It is the authoritarian nature of colonial and 
post-colonial states in Southern Africa that make it possible for events like OM or the 
Marikana massacre (Alexander, 2013) in South Africa5.   This (Southern Africa) is not (yet) a 
context for collaborative or participatory planning even though such state –citizen and 
governance relations are prescribed for in national constitutions and planning laws.   
 
The academic or scholarly discussions of planning and power are well-intentioned partly to 
improve the profession’s status. However, planning is a subtle, implicit form of state power 
and domination. To the extent that planning represents and conceals state power, it is a fetish. 
The real power (political, economic, financial, and social) that shapes cities lies elsewhere 
outside of planners and planning.  For  planning academics to dilute this point leads them to  
ascribe and attribute to planning and planners’ capacity they do not have.    Planners and 
planning in Zimbabwe had no capacity to neither institute nor to stop OM just as much as 
they could neither instigate nor stop jambanja a few years earlier.  Their existence is as tools 
or instruments used by those in power.  Hence the government rhetoric that OM was about 
restoring order in the planning system should be viewed as such namely, the state using 
/abusing its tools - planning.  In a way Kamete (2009) was correct to characterise planners 
and planners as the handmaidens of state repression.   This and Potts (2011) seem to be the 
more analytically correct interpretations which planning scholars should deepen.   
 
For those engaged in fetishism, the things they venerate appear real and not illusions.  
Kamete (2013) repeatedly castigates the authorities for having a fetish about informality that 
is fuelled by an obsession for modernity. In this sense, the fetish has elements of ‘delusion’ 
and ‘desire’ (Pietz, 1993: 136).   However it is not explicit whether reference to authorities in 
Kamete (2013) also means planners or whether it is an acceptance that power resides beyond 
planning and planners.  Authorities could be central government or the state.    On the face of 
it, it appears true that planning and planners in Zimbabwe (and Southern Africa) seek an 
urban order inspired by what prevails in the colonial metropole (Kamete, 2011: 17).  But this 
may be missing the point of what happens behind and beyond planning or for whom cities 
are planned; fetishism in the sense of what is concealed. “Where does the power lie?” 
 
 It appears that for Southern Africa, state-capital forces are more significant than ‘citizen’ 
forces.  Cities like Harare, Maputo, Johannesburg and Lusaka may exhibit production and 
consumption patterns that are materially poor relative to London and New York.  Yet 
inherently, they all are capitalist cities.  They are products of the capitalist system and their 
form and function – both real and imagined – as well as planning and planners, should be 
understood in this context.  Concepts of processes of capital accumulation help explain the 
                                                 
5 Abundant media articles and videos include  The Guardian (2015) “Marikana massacre: the 
untold story of the strike leader who died for workers’ rights”     
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/19/marikana-massacre-untold-story-strike-
leader-died-workers-rights [last visited 3rd July 2017] 
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contradictory existence (Harvey, 2014) of modernist projects like Westgate (in Harare) or 
Manda Hill (in Lusaka) and Sandton (Johannesburg) alongside desperate poverty and the 
recurrence of evictions of the poor even in countries deemed more democratic than 
Zimbabwe – Zambia, Tanzania and South Africa included. In other words, the material and 
institutional conditions of cities on one hand and the nature of planning and planners are 
intertwined with the contested roles they (have to) play in the local and global processes of 
capital accumulation.   
 
Another aspect that remains unexplored is about how community cultures, aspirations and 
perceptions are implicated in OM. Official media and government responses to the global 
backlash against OM presented positive views of what the operation intended to achieve 
(Vambe, 2008).  These views in relation to the nature of planning and desired role, form and 
function of cities has not been empirically examined at the community level. In particular 
whether it is possible that ‘behind the scenes’ urban residents in Zimbabwe despise ‘filth’ 
and that other than the violence, they may aspire for the cleanliness and the modernist 
principles allegedly behind OM. Several observations help to underline why this is an 
important question to pose.  If one looks at 2006-2009 pictures of Mbare hostels at the height 
of Zimbabwe’s political economic crisis and poverty (See photo Figure 1), the people and 
neighbourhood look poor.  Yet also conspicuous are metropole and global products such as 
satellite dishes.  Clearly, they may be poor, but their desires and consumption aspirations are 
no different from those of middle classes and elites in the western world.  Could it be likely 
that these desires extend to desires for middle class physical environments and if so how 
should planning and planners respond?    
 
Furthermore, when going round Zimbabwe’s countryside and looking at anthropological 
vignettes of village life from before colonial intrusion, the Zimbabwe homestead appears as 
smart, well layered out, with separate zones for different uses including designated places for 
rubbish disposal.  This ‘rural psychology of cleanliness’ is organic and not a colonial import.   
When rural inhabitants come to cities, what becomes of this ‘psychology of cleanliness’, how 
do planners respond to it and how much of it was implicated in OM and people’s ex-post 
view of the campaign some years later?   These   empirical questions are posed here to 
suggest that there is much more that planning scholars should be exploring beyond the basic 
colonial inheritance argument.   
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To recap, interrogating planning power (Kamete, 2011) seems to be an enduring world-wide 
concern for planning scholars (for example Gordon, 1991; Mantysalo, 2008; Harris, 2011; 
Karki, 2015; Grange, 2016; Dobrucka, 2017).  In the case of contemporary Zimbabwe, the 
real power resides in the state; somewhere in ZANU (PF) the revolutionary ruling party6 and 
its instruments of power; the military, secret service, prisons, police and youth militia.  
Somewhere among these were the brains behind the military-style execution of OM; the 
internet is awash with videos showing this military presence.     
 
Moreover, after ‘weighing relevant empirical evidence’, Kamete (2009: 1) rightly observed 
that planning and planners had no role in the instigation and design of Operation 
Murambatsvina. Also correct is the view that while planners could be accused of not standing 
up to politically voice opposition to the campaigns (Kamete, 2007: 166) the conclusion 
remains that the state had made up its mind and nothing would stop it.  A perusal of most 
planning statutes and handbooks shows that planning equates to what Kamete (2012) 
describes as normative and pastoral use of power.  Consequently, when the form of power in 
operation is sovereign and disciplinary (and not pastoral), the operation ceases to be planning 
as was the case in OM.  This is the consistent message that should be underlined.  The 
question to examine is why at different times or critical moments, the state intervenes with 
sovereign power in ways that marginalise normative pastoral power; in other words, what 
determines the nature of ‘governmentality’ (Gordon, 1991).  
 
                                                 
6  Party activists now prefix ‘revolutionary’ in any reference to the ruling party and sections of the Zimbabwean 
media seems to have taken it up partly as a mockery.  
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In addition, what is often forgotten, is that the majority of planners in Zimbabwe are civil 
servants (see Kamete, 2009; Mbiba et al. 2015) or as scholars and consultants, are dependent 
on the state for their livelihoods (see Dobrucka, 2017).   At the peak of Zimbabwe’s decade 
of economic crisis (post 1999) planners did not (and still do not) have the luxuries enjoyed by 
foreign and diaspora commentators; standing up against the state, resistance politics (or 
fearless speech as suggested by Grange, 2016) would and will lead not only to loss of a 
livelihood but even life itself.  In their critique of planners and planning in Zimbabwe, 
planning scholars should pose and ask what they would have done had they been in the 
position of a frontline local authority or private consultancy planner in Zimbabwe in June 
2005. 
 
Conclusion: the deadly tasks ahead  
This paper contributes to enduring debates about the nature of planning and its relation to 
power from the specific context of Zimbabwe’s (in)famous 2005 Operation Murambatsvina. 
Planning is a fetish in that its institutional, procedural and technical portrayal conceals 
prevailing forces of state and capitalist power.  It also can be a fetish when scholars ascribe to 
planning and planners powers which they do not have.  These lead to analytical lapses into 
misplaced understanding of urban processes and the role of planning in post-colonial 
Southern Africa and in particular phenomena such as OM in Zimbabwe.  The narrative 
presented here has sought to illustrate and reinforce the fact that OM was neither planning 
nor were planners the drivers as portrayed  in planning scholarship (see Watson , 2006; 
Watson and Agbola, 2013).   
 
Between them, Kamete (2007, 2009) and Potts (2011) have made some notable contributions 
on the Murambatsvina debates.  However, there are gaps and often a lack of consistency in 
the analysis.   Empirically, beyond interviews with local councillors and planners in different 
cities, more needs to be done. First, a number of key actors remain to be interrogated; namely 
then Police Commissioner (Mr Chihuri), then Minister of State Security (Hon. Dydimus 
Mutasa); then Minister of Local Government (Hon.  Ignatius Chombo);  members from the 
military/security Joint Operations Command (JOC) (including General Constantine 
Chiwenga – now Vice President of Zimbabwe) and members of ZANU (PF) at national, 
provincial and district level.   Second as argued elsewhere (Mbiba, 2017) is the need to use 
internal institutional archives from key institutions as a source of information to enrich 
planning scholarship (see also Manytsalo, 2008), to illustrate empirically the dynamics of 
power in and around planning.  Third, the fetish and fetishism of planning and planners can 
only be revealed and abandoned if planning scholarship steps outside of planning to utilise 
insights and frameworks from other disciplines; crucially to recognise political economy 
dynamics that shape planning.  What these dynamics are was not a central concern for this 
paper although pointers have been provided of what this may look like. 
 
The paper argued that as compliance oriented statutory control and enforcement process, 
Zimbabwe’s planning is flexible and not as bad as it is often made to appear.  Once the fetish 
with planning is exposed, it can be recognised that on a practical level and given the political 
and military DNA of OM, scholars should stand up and ‘attack’ the state, military and 
security establishment that were clearly behind the phenomenon and remain behind much of 
the ongoing abuse of urban planning laws in Zimbabwe.  Such a pathway is deadly; a key 
point that  should be kept in mind when giving critical commentary about failures of planners 
and planning in the country. Probably, and in order to accomplish much of what planning is 
allegedly failing to do in Africa, more planners should enter real politics where significant 
power resides (Karki, 2015).References 
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